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Agriculture becomes more and more crucial in keeping world trade relations on a firm basis.
The present paper aims to give a broad outline of the main agricultural issues expected to be
raised in the framework of the multilateral trade negotiations under the next WTO round.
Since the EU represents one of the principal actors in the world agricultural trade,  it is
believed that the EU position on these issues will affect not only the content but most
probably the outcome also of the negotiations. This paper will try to present the EU approach
in the forthcoming negotiations in relation to the priorities identified and set recently by the
EU.
2. The CAP and the GATT: A difficult coexistence
There is no doubt that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has become and still is the
most important and most comprehensive common policy ever developed by the EU, at least
in terms of integrity and budget. Since its establishment and inclusion in the initial Treaty of
Rome, in 1957, the CAP succeeded in transforming EC in world markets from a net importer
of agricultural products to a net exporter.
This success (and the criticism thereof) is attributed to the fact that under the CAP (and
especially during its full operation up to 1992), a high level of support and protection has
been applied for the European agriculture, based almost exclusively on a price support
mechanism for the main agricultural commodities, which happen to participate extensively in
the world trade.
For those who are not familiar with the issue and expecting that agricultural trade, as part of
the overall trade, should in principle be subject to the original “General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade” (GATT), a reasonable question arises, how CAP (but also many other similarly
protective policies applied by other States) could be established and even developed, since
most of the basic policy instruments used, were clearly incompatible with almost all GATT
rules and principles.
The answer lies to the fact that almost all the Contracting Parties took advantage of the
various exceptions included into the GATT Agreement itself, with regard to the agricultural
products, based either on permanent or on country-specific derogations (waivers).
In particular, the EC based the internal component of CAP on the disposition of Article
XXIV (according to which the provisions (rules and principles) of GATT do not prevent the
formation of a Custom Union or/and Free Trade Areas) and the external component on© EIPA
•   Article XI (concerning the general elimination of quantitative restrictions), which allows
agriculture to be exempted from the prohibition of the use of non-tariff barriers (under
certain conditions) and on
•   Article XVI (on subsidies), which also offers possibilities (under certain conditions again
but open to legal interpretations) either to grand or maintain any subsidy (including
income and price support) or to grant export subsidies for agricultural products.
In general, all over the world, it was considered that the agricultural products could be
excepted from the GATT rules and disciplines, for various reasons, having to do with the
strategic choice of all the countries, especially after the tragic experiences of the II World
War, to achieve Food Security. The “philosophy” behind it was that agricultural products
were not simply merchandises but mainly goods necessary for the survival of the human
being, justifying therefore a kind of “special treatment”.
However, all the years of operation of GATT, agricultural trade was a major source of
permanent conflict between the big agricultural exporting countries (USA, Canada, Australia,
Latin-American, etc.) and those countries that had being in big deficit of agricultural
production and were trying to recover from the war (as it was the case of the European
countries). For the first group, in particular, liberalisation should be a target for agricultural
trade as well as it was accepted for the industrial products, and they repeatedly tried to bring
agricultural products under the general rules of GATT. For the second group, however, other
priorities, political, economic, social, structural, but also important historical, practical and
technical reasons did not allow them to share the views of the first group. Among other
things, the objections raised against the prospect of liberalising the agricultural trade were
due, perhaps, to the fears that, apart of the rhetorics, the overall aim of the “liberalisers”
(which were not seriously damaged by the last War) was in fact to take advantage of the
initial difficulties for recovering and gain the maximum possible access to their food markets
at a proper time.
3. The background – A brief overview
Generally, the first seven Rounds of world trade negotiations that took place under GATT
since 1947 did not achieve too much in the field of agriculture, due also to the fact that, in the
years of big industrial expansion, their main focus was on the progressive reduction of tariffs
in industrial rather than agricultural products. However, since its establishment, the CAP was
always brought on the table of negotiations. In particular:
3.1. Dillon Round (1960-61)
The EEC participated for first time, as a single entity. The creation and inclusion of the CAP
objectives into the Treaty of Rome prompted negotiations within the GATT (according to
Article XXIV). At this early stage, the EEC accepted (as a counterbalance) lower duties on
fruit and vegetables and (under article XXIV-6) offered free market access (zero tariff) for 3
arable crops: soybean, cotton, oilseeds. This binding concession was the origin of the crucial
choice made by the EEC, in the process of establishing the CAP, to exclude these products
(which operate in the food chain as substitutes of  cereals in animal feed) from any price
support measures.
3.2 Kennedy Round (1964-67)© EIPA
It coincided with the establishment of the major Common Organisations of Markets under
CAP (cereals, dairy products, beef) and, subsequently, with the first full implementation of
CAP.
During the Round, the CAP came under attack by the US and als wanted to abolish the
system of variable levies in imports. However, only marginal concessions were agreed (the
EEC accepted a zero duty for manioc and other cereal substitutes). In a parallel negotiating
procedure outside GATT, the International Wheat Convention was also concluded.
3.3. The Tokyo Round (1973-79)
Despite the fact that the Round took place under a very negative international economic
environment (monetary instability, oil crisis, food shortages), once again, the CAP was at the
centre of dispute. The US questioned the CAP basic mechanism (variable levies & export
refunds). The final outcome of the Round on agriculture was largely determined by a bilateral
EU-US compromise based upon a discipline on the use of export subsidies. In addition, the
EU made marginal concessions on some products (tobacco, hilton beef, certain types of
cheese). Two commodity agreements were also concluded under the auspices of GATT,
establishing consultations for bovine meat and on dairy products.
4. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA)
Since 1986, when the Punta Del Este declaration launched the Uruguay Round, all the
participants agreed to take on the task of reincorporating agriculture into the GATT, by
promoting policy reform processes to the agricultural sector. However, the 113 Members of
GATT were, broadly speaking, divided into two main groups of Countries, representing two
opposite negotiating positions, concerning the agricultural policies:
On the one side, the US and the 15 of the Cairns group
1 advocated mainly:
•   The complete elimination of export subsidies within 5 years, and
•   A substantial (75%) reduction in trade-distorting domestic support
That is, they advocated extremely radical reforms of the agricultural policies applied up to
this time (and not only by EEC). In a short period (within 10 years), these reforms could lead
to a full liberalisation of the agricultural trade.
On the other side, the EU, EFTA, Japan and most of the food-importing developing
countries were opposed to such a liberalisation. They could favour, instead, limited reforms,
only for those products that participated substantially in the world trade, by reducing
domestic support at a level required to restore the equilibrium in the world markets.
The negotiating gap between the two groups dominated the 4-year discussions and, at the end
of 1990, the Round did not succeed to reach an agreement (as it was initially scheduled).
The negotiations restarted at the end of 1991, on the basis of accepting separate commitments
on three categories of policies:
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Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay© EIPA
•   Border Protection (Market Access)
•   Domestic Support
•   Export Competition
It should be reminded that, it was the time when the 1992 reform of CAP was adopted which
certainly changed the thrust of the UR negotiations.
Finally, a compromise was reached, between the two main actors (the EU and the US), in
December 1992, in the so-called "Blair House Agreement" that allowed a final agreement
to be reached in December 1993 and the “Final Act” to be signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, on
April 1994.
In general, the commitments undertaken by the signatories of the World Trade
Organisation – WTO (which replaced the GATT) under the URAA, should be implemented
over a 6-year period, starting in 1995 till the end of 2000, and by using as a base or reference
period for the various measurements, mostly the average of 1986-88 of the relevant statistical
data.
The most important, however, specific commitments in each of the above policy areas have,
in brief, as follows:
4.1. Border Protection (Market Access)
4.1.1. Tariffication
The “tariffication” implies that all the non-tariff barriers (applied at the frontiers for
agricultural products) should be converted into fixed tariffs, which, in turn, should be reduced
by 36% on average, over the 6 year period.
From the point of view of CAP, this was perhaps the most important commitment undertaken
under URAA. As a result of it, the variable levies (together with the threshold prices) which
constituted, up to that time, one of the most essential mechanisms of CAP, disappeared.
Therefore, one of the three fundamental principles governing CAP from the very beginning,
that of "community preference", lost most of its significance. And this is because, even if
the tariff equivalents are considered today too high, these levels are subject to gradual
reductions at a fixed base (according to the GATT principle of tariff bindings). Given that the
overall trade negotiations principally aim at tariff reductions in general, one should expect
that tariffs, sooner or later, will continually decrease in the next successive Rounds, up to
their elimination.
4.1.2. Safeguard Clause
This clause, agreed initially in Blair House, is included into the URAA (Article 5) and
provides a notable derogation from the principle of bound tariffs for all products. Under this
clause, the Contracting Parties are allowed to temporarily apply additional duties (for
products specified in their schedules of concessions) if the quantity of imports rises too
quickly in relation to an average over the previous 3 years, or if the import prices fall more
than 10% below a certain level (“trigger price”). In this sense, the safeguard clause, if
applied, could be considered as the only remaining element of "variability" at the frontier
protection.© EIPA
It should be noted that the whole issue of the "safeguard clause" was agreed upon the
insistence of the EU in URAA, as the EU tried to keep a "safety net" to avoid any market
disturbances by excessive imports
2. During the implementation period, however, other trade
partners took also advantage of this clause
3.
4.1.3. Market access
In relation to the previous "import quota arrangements", by converting levies and other non-
tariff barriers into “tariff rate quotas”, the signatories agreed to “regulate” the market access
in respect to two components:
a) The current access component, according to which the import tariff concessions granted
before the agreement must be maintained at least at their 1986-88 levels (incorporating
therefore, all the pre-existing import quota agreements), and
b) The minimum access component, which provide access for additional imports by opening
up market shares for third countries at least to 3-5% of the 1986-88 volume of consumption
for each group of products.
The latter, however, should not be understood as an obligation to import. It is a granting of a
reduced custom duty for this minimum quantity of imports. In this respect, there are two
points to be raised:
•   First, this commitment applies to the sectors subject to tarrification only. Therefore, for
the EU, products like fruits & vegetables, wine, etc are excluded from this commitment,
as they had not variable levies before the agreement to be tarrified.
•   Second, the minimum access applies with regard to aggregation, that is, considering
groups of products rather than isolated products. It should be noted that the "aggregation
principle" was acceded to a EU insistent demand.
4.2 Domestic Support
The commitment includes the obligation to reduce the general level of domestic support by
20% compared with the 1986-88 base period. This commitment on support reductions could
be applied on commodity grouping rather than on individual commodities.
The level of the domestic support provided for an agricultural product is measured (and
monitored) on the basis of the “Aggregate Measurement of Support” (AMS), which is an
indicator developed by OECD at an earlier stage
4. Therefore, the crucial issue for the
principal negotiators in this category of commitments was not so much the lower or higher
level of reduction, but rather to agree which forms/measures of support would be included
into the calculation of the AMS for each Contracting Party. In other words, which measures
would be subject or not to the reduction commitments and which would be exempted.
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3 See footnote 7.
4 The AMS was the result of adapting other indicators used by OECD, and in particular, the Producer and
Consumer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE, CSE). It was designed to express and compare the various measures of
support that affect production and trade. Generally, it is based on the difference between the domestic and world
price of each commodity multiplied by the volume of its production.© EIPA
At the end, the domestic support measures were classified into three lists or “boxes” and
agreed:
•   The “Yellow Box” including all the price supports and aids that definitely affect the size
of production and trade and, therefore, been considered as trade-distorting measures, are
under the agreed reduction commitment over the 6-year period,
•   The “Green Box” including all the measures that have no effect on trade or production
(completely decoupled measures) and are totally exempted from any reduction,
•   The “Blue Box” including various types of aids that are linked to limiting production
schemes. According to this sophisticated definition, the measures included in the “Blue
Box” are not clearly defined as supportive measures with no or some effect on
production and trade. However, they are also totally exempted from reductions (like the
measures included into the “Green Box”) for, at least, the given period of the “Peace
Clause”, and they are referred as:
•   The acreage aids granted to crops on the basis of fixed yields
•   The aids that do not exceed 85% of the baseline production level
•   The aids granted to livestock production (premia) on the basis of fixed number of
animal units
Clearly, the “Blue Box”, which was originally a basic element of the “Blaire House
Agreement” between the EU and the US, intends to keep out of any commitment for
reduction two specific measures:
•   The direct Compensatory Payments (CPs) introduced by in the 1992 CAP reform and
applied since then by the EU, and
•   The deficiency payments applied by the US in implementing its agricultural policy
5.
Though agreed, the “Blue Box” arrangement is a controversial and increasingly disputed
issue. From the side of the EU, the CPs included into the “Blue Box” are largely production-
neutral (since they are based on historical production and do not fluctuate with the level of
output) and therefore justified to continue to be exempted from any reduction even in the
future. From the side of the US and the CAIRNS, the “Blue Box” category has been inverted
as a transitional measure in the URAA. It reflected the need to establish a middle ground
between the major negotiating parties to address specific problems in their agriculture. The
policy measures included, however, should not be considered as decoupled from the
production and therefore are not eligible to enjoy the status of the “Green Box” measures.
4.3 Export Subsidies
The most important element of the commitments in this category was the fact that the
Agreement tackled not only on the value of subsidies but also on the volume of subsided
exports. In particular, and on the basis of 1986-90 reference period, the export subsidies
should be reduced over 6 years, by:
•   21% by volume of subsidised exports(with the exemption of processed products) and
•   36% by direct expenditure on export subsidies (ad valorem)
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The agricultural exports have been divided into 20 most specific categories (for instance,
differentiating wheat and flour from feed grains, or separating cheese, butter and skimmed
milk powder from dairy products) in a way that reductions would be made year by year and
by product category. The exports, however, realised under (permanent or emergent) food aid
schemes are exempted from the commitments, on the assumption that are not linked to
commercial exports.
4.4. Other Commitments
From what has being noted before, it is clear that the overall result of the URAA implies a
number of significant changes in (scheduling and applying) the agricultural policies all over
the world. And this is because, it was only after this Round when agriculture was fully
integrated into the GATT/WTO system. In fact, after the URAA, agricultural policies and, in
particular CAP, could never be the same in the future as used to be in the past. In this respect,
some other commitments should be also taken into account:
4.4.1. Peace Clause
Perhaps one of the most important elements included into the URAA (Article 13) is the so-
called “Peace Clause”, under which, policy measures related to internal support and export
subsidies that comply with the Agreement will not be challenged under the WTO procedures.
Following the Blair House compromise for its 10-year duration, the Peace Clause expires at
the end of 2003.
4.4.2. Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement
To ensure that technical measures are not used as non-tariff barriers in the future, the
signatories agreed to set up a forum for consultations, under the WTO, the “Committee on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures”. The main aim of this Committee would be to
supplement the existing standards code
6 by further promoting the international harmonisation
on these delicate and highly scientific issues. In this process, other specialised multinational
Organisations (International Office of Epizootics, International Convention for Plant
Protection, Codex Alimentarius) would have to play an important role in establishing the
technical standards.
In monitoring the above process, the Committee may approve the use of higher than the
agreed standards on the basis of “scientific evidence” or as a consequence of “risk
assessment”. These terms, however, being open also to legal interpretations, have raised
already a number of important disputes among the main signatories, in terms, for instance, of
using or not the so-called “precautionary principle” in taking restrictive measures on trade of
agricultural and food products.
4.4.3. Some other specialised issues
Apart of the above general commitments applied by all the signatories of URAA, the two
main actors, the EU and the US, agreed also on the basis of a bilateral compromise (Blair
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House Agreement) some partial but directly related with the status of CAP concessions on
certain sectors (oilseeds, corn, malt, non-food plantings on set-aside land, etc)
5. The agricultural agenda of the next Round
Well before the expiration of the URAA in the middle of 2000, a new Round has been
announced to start in 30 November 1999, in Seattle, USA.
It is reasonably expected that Agriculture will be again at the centre of the negotiations in the
next Round. In addition, it seems that all the Contracting Parties (the EU in particular) are
aware of the fact that there will be a strong pressure “to continue the process towards greater
liberalisation” in agricultural trade that started in the previous Round. Therefore, it is rather
obvious that the overall approach of the future negotiations will be to deal with the issues that
remained unresolved by the URAA, since URAA is considered to be only the start towards
the liberalisation process. After all, the same actors, as before, have already declared their
aims and targets during the next Round.
In relation to the assessments of the URAA and based on the announcements or declarations
already made by the principal actors of the game (the US and the Cairns group, the EU and
Japan), one could reasonably expect that, in each policy area, the agenda of the future
negotiations will include the following issues.
5.1. Market Access
•   Tariff rates: The most important element of the URAA, the “tariffication”, should be
considered as a permanent part of the agricultural trade from now on. However, although
bound, the tariff levels for agricultural products were set at a high level, outweighing in
most cases the average level of the previously applied levies and other non-tariff
measures. Therefore, the tariff reductions agreed in URAA have had little effect on the
access that the big exporting countries could have to rich consumer markets. It is
estimated that agricultural tariffs average above 40% as compared with manufacturing
tariffs (which have been almost eliminated or they stand around 5-10% in most industrial
countries). In addition, for a number of agricultural products, certain countries still apply
even tariff peaks (the so-called “mega-tariffs”) of over 300%
7. Given that the US and the
Cairns Group are united in their aim at further large reductions of tariffs, possibly with
maximum tariff rates, it should be expected that, at least, a certain reduction of tariffs on
agricultural products would be resulted (above all) out of the next Round.
•   Safeguard Clause: The Cairns Group has insisted that will raise this issue as no longer
necessary and it should be abolished. It is not clear what the position of the US will be,
given that it was one of the least signatories that invoked this clause in the recent past
8.
                                                
7 T. Josling (see references) chooses as examples of such megatariffs, the cases of Canada (299% on butter and
289% on cheese in 2000) and of India (97% for unprocessed and 139% for processed products)
8 By invoking the safeguard clause in June 1998, the US imposed quotas on imports of wheat
gluten from the EU and Australia for a 3-year period. The US asserted that the EU, in
particular, realises unfairly subsidising wheat gluten exports and, for this reason, the EU
quota was set at a half volume compared to its 1997 exports.
According to the EU regime, however, wheat gluten (commonly used in the baking industry)
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On the other side, Japan is expected to seek to maintain as much of its current border
protective mechanisms as possible, while the EU has already declared its aim to maintain
or renew this clause against any potential market disturbance by excessive imports.
•   Minimum market access: It seems that the access arrangements of URAA will form a
major target for both the US and the Cairns, which have already declared their objective
for a higher than 5% share of the internal consumption. The US, in particular, is likely to
aim initially for the elimination of the tariff quotas or at their considerable expansion.
Although the EU is expected to fight against this prospect, it seems that it is also ready to
make some concessions on this issue, since it has included in its objectives a better access
to import markets. However, it is quite probable that the EU will be faced with three types
of requests on this issue:
•   An increase of the minimum access in its own rich consumers’ internal market at a
level much higher that 5% of its internal consumption for each group of products (a
result that could be attained by changing also the reference period from 1986-88 to a
more representative period of consumption)
•   Elimination of the aggregation (groupings of products) and making minimum access
commitment on a product by product basis
•   Inclusion of all the sectors (and not only those subject to tariffication) into the
minimum access commitment. (Among other things, such an approach would
certainly create great disputes inside the EU, among the M-S, in regards especially to
the general treatment of the Mediterranean products)
5.2. Domestic Support
•   Base period: It has been repeatedly remarked that, during the reference period of 1986-88
on which the commitments of URAA were based for the calculation of the AMS
indicator, the levels of domestic support were at their peak. Due to this fact, the
commitment of the 20% reduction had very little or no impact on the overall level of
domestic support. Therefore, the same period could not be considered as a representative
one for further commitments. It is rather sure that the future negotiations will make a
focus on this point and, perhaps, controversies would inevitably arise as to which period
should be chosen.
•   Commodity groupings: In certain cases, the groupings allowed to make higher support
reductions for some less important products and prevented significant reductions in others
that are considered much more important in terms of inter-trade. The issue is expected to
be raised on the insistence mainly of the Cairns group.
•   The “blue box” issue: The maintenance or not of the “blue box” will become, quite
possibly, one of the major issues during the forthcoming negotiations. The US do not
seem to have anymore interest on this, since they (claim that) have turned their previous
“deficiency payments” into completely "production-neutral" policy measures. The Cairns
have already called for an end to “Blue Box” measures and a redefinition of domestic
support, to eliminate all the ambiguities that allow trade-distorting practices. As it has
                                                                                                                                                       
to bridge the gap between the price of EU raw materials and the world market price - but this
is compatible with the WTO commitments). In retaliation against the decision by the US, the
Commission approved in July 1998, an import tariff duty on US corn gluten. However, this
duty cannot come into effect until June 2001, because, having the US quotas officially
described as a "safeguard measure", they are protected from retaliation under WTO for three
years.© EIPA
been mentioned before, the measures included into “Blue Box” are considered as partially
decoupled from production but were exempted from reductions on the grounds that they
help to curb output. The measures are also exempted from any major ambiguity until
2003, when the “Peace Clause” expires. However, since the EU started replacing the
previous price support system into a system of direct support schemes, the CPs become a
rather permanent part of CAP and their acceptability in the future trade agreements is
increasingly challenging for the world trade partners. Mostly externally but also internally
(for budgetary and other reasons), voices have been raised against the (infinite)
continuation of CPs, as they stand, implying that, in the future, the “Blue Box” measures
should, either be included into the AMS reduction commitments or become subject to a
separate reduction commitment. It seems inevitable that the EU system of CPs will come
under pressure from both, the US and the Cairns, in the forthcoming Round.
5.3. Export subsidies
This is the most disputed issue among the main actors and it is reasonably expected that the
negotiations will focus on this category of measures in terms of both, the volume of
subsidised exports and the overall expenditure dedicated for subsidies.
•   The group of Cairns has already declared that their first priority would be the complete
elimination of export subsidies.
•   The US would favour a substantial reduction of export subsidies, although, despite the
rhetorics, it is not clear to what extent, since they have activated or put aside mechanisms
that are considered as kinds of export subsidies as well
9
•   The EU seems to be prepared for making further concessions on this issue. After all, the
new reform of CAP has been decided on the grounds of decreasing the guaranteed prices
at a level (though not sufficient) enabling to shorten the gap between internal and world
prices. This would allow also export refunds to be decreased considerably (if not
eliminated) in the next 3-4 years. However, the EU's target would be two-fold:
■ To take an offensive stance against US export credits and state trading enterprises
■ To retain the right to utilise export refunds, when necessary
A principal EU condition, however, for making further concessions on export subsidies
would be to make sure that "blue box" is retained.
6. The EU Approach
The EU being quite aware of the forthcoming Round, has already formally adopted (May
1999) a new reform of CAP to be implemented during the period 2000-2006 in the
framework of a broader package of measures, the well known Agenda 2000. It is supposed
that one of the most important targets of the new CAP reform was to allow the EU to go into
                                                
9 Export credits and tax exemptions for exporters through "Foreign Sales Corporations" are often mentioned as
good examples. In May 1998, the US administration announced measures to reactivate the tools of their "Export
Enhancing Programme". The programme is supposed to act as a "safety net". Its aim would be to facilitate
exports by adopting a number of export-promoting measures. Such measures included: Subsidisation of the sales
of poultry meat in middle East; financial guarantee to exporters selling at regions where import requirements
were strict and unpredictable and who would otherwise be reluctant to commit to an export contract;
Compensate traders who had to send a shipment onto another destination if it was blocked in the original port on
health grounds (example: The Greek authorities prohibited a consignment of US wheat, in May 1998, which
was then sold onto FYROM with additional transport costs)© EIPA
the next Round with more aggressive stance and to leave ground for defending the so called
“European model of Agriculture”
10.
In relation to the new round, the Berlin Agreement on Agenda 2000 (March 1999) included a
reference by stating that "the decisions adopted regarding the new CAP reform would
constitute essential elements in defining the Commission's negotiating mandate for the future
multilateral negotiations at the WTO." Agenda 2000, therefore, forms the core  of EU's
negotiating positions.
In line with this (binding) declaration and shortly after the formal adoption of the reform, in
the beginning of last July 1999, the Commission communicated its negotiating priorities and
asked for their approval from the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The
Council of Ministers for Agriculture unanimously agreed to back the Commission's agenda
on the issue
11, while the Council of Foreign Ministers is also expected to formally approve
the final mandate to the Commission at its meeting of 11/10/1999.
Although there is a clear determination to avoid taking a "defensive" role in the next round,
the priorities set by the Commission, as broadly listed, could be still identified as either
defensive or/and aggressive:
"Defensive" issues:
•   A successful defense of the "blue box"
•   Renewal of the "Peace Clause" after the year 2003
•   Renewal of the "special safeguard provisions"
•   Secure that its rural and environmental policies are compatible with the new trade order
•   Defense of the "multifunctional" role of agriculture
"Aggressive" issues:
•   Improved access to third countries' markets
•   Intention to target the US' use of export credits and state trading enterprises
•   Bring into the negotiating arena new issues, including food safety and quality, trade and
environment, animal welfare
•   An overall agreement on the Round as a comprehensive "single undertaking"
The EU stance in each one of the above priorities has as follows:
6.1. "Blue box"
Without doubt, the maintenance of the "Blue Box" as one of the existing provisions in the
URAA "on which key elements of the EU's agricultural policy is built", will be a priority
objective for the EU. In its communication of July 1999, the Commission has clearly pointed
out that the defense of the "blue box" is considered "essential to ensure implementation of
CAP reform". Additionally, Commission's officials have repeatedly rejected suggestions that
                                                
10 It is usually mentioned that EU has not clearly defined this model. The Commission has described that the
main line of the model should be “diverse forms of agriculture, rich in tradition, which are not just output-
oriented but seek to maintain the visual amenity of the European countryside as well as vibrant and active rural
communities, generating and maintaining employment” . See A. Swinbank (references)
11 During its informal meeting in Tampere, Finland on 13-14/9/1999,  the Council of Ministers for Agriculture
outlined a partial "mandate" to the Commission, concerning the agricultural part of the forthcoming
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the next Round would force the EU into a further set of (substantial) reforms (as it was the
case of the previous UR, when the 1992 reform became inevitable before the round was
concluded). However, one could raise two points here:
•   As a result of watering down the initial proposals of the Commission concerning the price
cuts of the most important Common Organisations of Markets, the Berlin agreement
(March 1999) on the new CAP reform included the prospect of mid-term reviews of
certain policies, at around 2002/2003. These “clauses” indicate that, most probably, the
EU will be forced to revise the decisions that have been taken in the light of the agreed
financial framework for the whole period, but also of the eastward enlargement. Among
other things, since the CPs already absorb more than half of the total EU agricultural
budget, their overall size in the near future becomes rather questionable, for internal
reasons.
•   It is also true that the reform package (and the financial framework agreed thereof) does
not go beyond 2006. In this sense, the possibility of some sort of commitment for the
future of CPs beyond 2006 (at a time when the round would have been terminated and the
EU would have experienced the first wave of new accessions from CEECs) is left open.
Entering into the new round, however, the EU's objective is to preserve the right to maintain
CPs either in the current "Blue Box" category or as environmental/social adjustment
measures. The Agenda 2000 CAP reform, leave some ground for manipulation:
•   The CPs would only partly compensate the loss of income in arable crops, as they will be
reduced proportionately in cases when internal average market prices are higher than the
intervention prices
•   To a certain extent, the CPs have become “greener” through the “cross compliance”
scheme, which has been introduced as a measure (though not obligatory for the M-S)
making the CPs conditional on environmental requirements
•   The CPs will not be provided for the farmers of the CEECs after their accession
Overall, the chances of defending the mechanism of CPs in the new round appear to be half
to half. From the one side, since the CPs were introduced in 1992, the Commission has
maintained that they are largely production-neutral because they are based on historical
production and do not fluctuate with the level of output. In addition, they are fixed and not
linked to changes in the world market prices. And it is true that, even if the EU converted a
large part of its AMS into direct support schemes, the CPs are paid in such a way that:
•   do not create additional incentives to increase the crop area planted or numbers of animals
produced;
•   do not increase yields by the use of additional variable inputs;
•   do not act as a disincentive to consumption.
On the other hand, one should take into account the following parameters:
•   OECD has reported that the CPs have replaced market support in the sum total of support
(contributing 50-60% in the income of EU's farmers), indicating therefore the market
distorting nature of CPs.
•   The total amount of CPs to the individual producers is still dependent upon the historic
reference yield of each region or upon the number of animals kept and, therefore, they
still sustain production.
•   Harmonising the CPs for cereals and oilseeds into one arable area payment does not
detach them from the area planted
•   Reports argue that, even if the CPs are completely detached from production, their
continuation beyond a transitional period cannot be justified, unless they are payments for© EIPA
some legitimate public good provisions (in the form of rural development and cultural
landscape)
•   It is clear that, whatever EU does with the CPs in the future, even completely decoupled,
the international competitors would find arguments to attack them. In fact, it is not the
measure as such provocative, but the ability of EU farmers to get a good income allowing




The clause exempts the policy measures of CAP (including the CPs) from any WTO
challenge up to the time of its expiration, in 2003, provided that these measures are in
conformity with the provisions of the URAA. The continuation of the “peace clause” in the
future, on the grounds of a new WTO agreement,  seems to be vital to EU; it would provide a
legal security for the outcome of the negotiations, and this would allow EU to implement its
reform in a smooth and comfortable way. In this sense, it looks also imperative for the EU to
have a rapid round of negotiations, before the expiry of the current peace clause. Otherwise,
if the clause is not rolled-over, all the fundamental mechanisms of CAP (domestic support
schemes, export subsidies, etc) could be subject to a succession of hostile Panel reports in the
following years. For instance:
•   Under the Subsidies Code (GATT Article XXIII), domestic support schemes (including
the CPs) could be challenged by countervailing duties,
•   Under GATT Article XVI, any kind of the “export subsidisation” component could be
also challenged
•   Under GATT Article XXIV, any current or future Free Trade Areas agreed and
established between EU and other countries (Mediterranean, S. Africa, Mercosur, etc)
that could exclude substantial agricultural sectors, will be open to WTO challenge.
6.3. Special Safeguard Clause
Although the EU has not invoked this clause since the URAA came into force, it is still
considered essential to be used as a “safety net” in protecting the EU internal market against a
potential surge in imports. This approach is rather in line with the overall intention of EU to
continue keeping in the future many of the current essential mechanisms of CAP
(intervention purchase, set-aside, export refunds etc) as “safety nets”. In its objective, EU will
be joined, most probably, by Japan, which is also expected, on the same line, to seek to
maintain as much of its current protective mechanisms as possible. On the other hand, the
US's stance is not clear on this issue. The Cairns, however, have already insisted that they
will raise the issue of the "special clause" for imports, as no longer necessary and it should be
abolished.
6.4. Rural Development and Agri-environmental measures –
Multifunctionality of Agriculture
                                                
12 The EU  having been the first world importer and the second larger exporter of the agricultural and food
products, it seems that the overall target of the trade competitors would be to push towards a European
agriculture without any preservation, since any kind of preservation could be easily criticised as an  "unfair
advantage" against the farmers of, at least, the developing countries.© EIPA
It is clear that the underway new reform of CAP aims inherently to a gradual shift in
emphasis of CAP from the support of markets and production to the restructuring of rural
areas and rural employment. Even if the new structural measures are considered inadequately
funded, the multifunctional role of agriculture in managing the country-side has been
carefully raised the last years, under the concept of an integrated rural development
strategy
13 (in line with the overall objective of “sustainable development”, which has been
included in Amsterdam Treaty – June 1997).
Since the protection of agricultural incomes is implied as one of the ultimate objectives of
CAP (Article 33.b of consolidated EC Treaty), the definition of “multifunctional agriculture”
seeks actually to justify the use of financial support to farming in order to preserve the rural
communities and the environment. To this extent, certain types of policy support measures
are indispensable. The EU is determined not only to defend this issue in the next round but
also to push it as a “non-trade concern” in a future trade agreement. The justification would
be that "multifunctionality" covers not only the production of goods and raw materials but
also public goods, as preserving the countryside heritage, environmental benefits, leisure, etc.
However, the food exporting countries regard the issue of “multifunctionality” with suspicion
rather, looking in it a potential excuse for continuing to treat agricultural products as special
cases in terms of trade rules.
The EU, although in ally with Japan on this issue, expects that, apart of the CPs, all measures
included under the structural, rural or agri-environmental policy will be scrutinised for their
compatibility with the "green box" criteria. If found faulty, the EU would have to adopt other,
more decoupled alternatives. For instance, the “Less Favoured Areas” scheme that provides
for special assistance aids to farmers engaged in certain EU agricultural areas, has changed
under the new reform by gradually transforming the aids from a production to a per hectare
basis. Even so, however, it is not quite sure whether the new arrangement meets the
requirements for a complete decoupling from the production.
Direct aid measures, however, even with minimal trade impact, are considered indispensable.
For this reason, the EU supports the idea of making the "green box" criteria more flexible,
even if the trade partners have rather expressed the opposite objective; to review and make
the "green" criteria more tightened.
6.5. Improved access to third markets
The EU expects that after the full implementation of the new CAP reform and on the
assumption that world prices will remain at reasonably high level, the existing gap between
the domestic and world prices will decrease considerably or even eliminated. Therefore,
under normal circumstances, the export subsidies for a number of products would not be
necessary. Taking into account the prospects of expanding world demand on food products,
the EU aims at taking full advantage of the new opportunities that would appear in the near
future. In this respect, the EU is rather prepared to make concessions related to its own
market on the assumption that certain barriers to market access of third countries (including
tariff quotas) are also lifted.
                                                
13 This concept was formally introduced by the EU in November 1996, when an important Conference took
place in Cork, Ireland, under the auspices of the Commission, the outcome of which was the well-known “Cork
Declaration”.© EIPA
6.6. USA’s subsidies
In the new Round, the EU has clarified its intention to look rather hard at the support schemes
of its trade partners
14. To counterbalance any attack on CPs included into the "blue box", the
EU argues that many other countries have made use of support payments under the same box.
By taking an offensive stance against the US export credits in particular, the EU argues that
export subsidies are not just about refunds but also all kinds of support that function as export
subsidies and have to be tackled during the next round
15. For the time being and under the
URAA, refunds are subject to limitations already, but export credits (as well as food aid been
available under credit terms) remain mostly under no WTO discipline and should be subject
to compliance with agreed trade rules. The issue has been pointed out even by OECD that has
noted an increasing tendency to use export credits to support a wider area of trade (especially
since the emergence of the economic crises in Asia and Russia). The same applies for the
State Trading Corporations, which in certain cases act as state monopolies in the world trade.
6.7. Non-trade concerns
To the EU's view, Article 20 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides that negotiations on key
trade issues can also cover non-trade related matters. It is sure that, apart of the
"multifunctionality" mentioned above, the EU will put high on the list of its objectives some
other issues of non-trade concerns of particular importance:
6.7.1. Agricultural environment
The intention for the negotiations is to cover potential environmental threats arising from
agricultural trade liberalisation and push towards accepting the so-called “eco-conditionality”
principle in scheduling and applying the agricultural policies. During the last years this issue
attracts more and more the attention not only of environment activists but also of independent
researchers and experts
16. To the EU's understanding, farmers exercising environment-
friendly practices should be able to be compensated for offering additional services to the
public.
6.7.2. Food safety and quality
The EU wishes to ensure that greater attention is paid to the justified interests of consumers
and that the WTO is not used as a pretext that allows placing products on the market "where
there are legitimate concerns about their safety", according to the Commission's view. This
                                                
14 The E. Commission has recently promised that will set up a special unit in DG VI to examine claims about the
WTO compatibipily of the US Farm Bill in anticipation of the next round. The Unit will examine in particular
whether the Fair Act payments are really decoupled, as they might be given in a way that farmers do not have
absolute choice which crops to plant. A range of other areas will be also looked where the US might be found to
be paying hidden subsidies to farmers.
15 As an example, the US Administration offered recently tax exemptions for exporters through the so-called
"Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs)" which are subsidiaries of US exporting firms based in tax haven countries
(Barbados, etc). The FSCs gain income tax relief as long as the product is predominantly produced in the USA.
In return, payments from FSCs to their parent companies in the USA are also exempted from tax. To the
Commission's view, those tax exemptions constitute trade distorting subsidies "by granting an unfair advantage
to US products".  (See, also, footnote 7)
16 A. Layard (see references) interestingly links the trade and environment debate with other important disputes
in relation to food safety and animal welfare issues .© EIPA
reference points out the fundamental difference of interpretation of the sanitary and phyto-
sanitary provisions of the URA, as well as on the “philosophy” of food quality. In particular,
the EU aims to maintain the right of applying own scientific assessment standards and, if
necessary, to restrict imports on health and consumer grounds. In other words, the EU is
determined to clarify and strengthen the existing WTO framework for the use of the
"precautionary principle" in the area of food safety (animal and human health protection). A
number of disputes still in progress, indicates that the following issues will strain
relationships, especially between the main protagonists, EU and USA, in the run up of the
next round:
•   The growth promoting hormones in beef production
17
•   The genetically modified crop seeds (GMOs) entering into the food chain
18
•   The use of antibiotics as additives in animal feed
After all, the BSE crisis and the recent dioxin scandal in Belgium would inevitably lead to
increasing calls for tighter controls and monitoring in the feed sector, at least across the EU,
which would have an increasing link with the trade rules.
6.7.3. Animal welfare
The animal welfare issue has become already one of the fundamental points of the
negotiation mandate for the round. Measures taken already by the EU to raise animal welfare
on a rather "ethical" basis, have as a minimum consequence that EU producers should be
given protection from imports of similar products, under less-welfare-friendly systems
elsewhere. Up to now, three possible approaches are examined:
•   A multilateral agreement establishing international welfare standards, and this is the
preferred option by the EU)
•   The potentiality to impose trade measures against countries whose standards fell short of
those required by the importing country
•   Labeling of livestock products, as regards the treatment of animals from which the
products derive from, to allow consumers'choise
19
                                                
17 Growth promoting hormones have been banned in the EU since 1988 on the grounds that
they may increase the risk of cancer in humans. Since then, the EU prohibited the imports of
hormones-treated beef. In Jan. 1998  a WTO panel on the issue accepted that the 10-year old
EU’s ban breaks the international trade rules, because it has failed to carry out a full scientific
assessment into the alleged risks from hormone use. To comply with the WTO rules, a
deadline was set up to 13/05/1999 for the EU to justify the ban on the grounds of the SPS
agreement. The EU maintains that the initial scientific studies have provided enough
evidence showing the potential risks to consumer health and therefore its ban is justified
under the precautionary principle. However, the completed scientific research analysis has
not been fully carried out yet by the Commission’s machinery. Even so, the EU believes that
the apparent conflict between consumer health concerns and trade rules has been resolved.
The appellate body in the hormones dispute had ruled that "countries had a wide level of
discretion to decide their own level of protection". This point of view, however, is not shared
by the US and other trade partners. As a result, the US and Canada took retaliatory measures,
in effect from 29/07/1999, against imports of certain EU products.
18 In so long, the issue of biotechnology has not been discussed in the framework of SPS agreement as part of
UR settlement. Some Contracting Parties and, in particular, the US, would rather prefer to avoid re-opening the
debate over the SPS provisions. However, apart the SPS, other WTO agreements (TBT, Rules of origin, GATT)
might prove to have relevance for biotechnology
19 In particular, compulsory beef labeling is supposed to be in place within the EU by Jan. 2000.© EIPA
Finally, potential other subjects to be raised by EU would be the trade-marking system (the
EU's policy on protected designations of origin), and agricultural labour protection.
6.8. Overall agreement of the new round
It is rather sure that the EU will inevitably have to make concessions on agriculture and
should therefore trade off potential losses against gains in other sectors, for instance, financial
services. That is why EU favours an overall agreement and not a sector-by-sector approach.
In any case, the EU maintains that, like in the previous UR, this new round must be also
comprehensive and cover other sectors than agriculture alone.
7. Concluding comments
Many spectators believe that, concerning agricultural trade, only modest progress is likely to
be made in the forthcoming Round. It is argued that, in the three main areas of agricultural
policies applied by the WTO trade partners (market access, domestic support, export
subsidies), it would be a matter of building on what was achieved in the URAA, rather than
the introduction of any new radical elements.
If this will be the case, the EU, opposite to the previous UR, will enter the negotiations well
prepared this time, by having taken already its decisions towards a new reform of the CAP,
which would constitute a given basis (core) for the negotiations. However, even if no radical
changes are expected to be agreed, the question arises whether the decisions adopted on CAP
will prove to be adequate to meet with even moderate requirements of the new trade
obligations.
In this respect, the Berlin Agreement of EU leaders on the new reform of CAP has been
criticised, internally and externally, as leaving very little ground for considerable concessions
in the trade negotiations. In particular, by making the full implementation of the reform
longer and by adopting price cuts for the most important products at a lower rate that initially
proposed by the Commission, the EU will be obliged to keep a rather more defensive than
offensive stance in the negotiations. For instance, the price cuts will prove to be rather
inadequate to eliminate or decrease considerably the use of export subsidies
20, although it is
well known that this issue stands at the top of its trade partners’ priorities. The US and the
Cairns have already commented that if the EU continued to use these measures, most
probably it would form a “major block in the continuum towards trade liberalisation". Some
other issues also of the reform package are expected to create more difficulties for the EU.
The increase of CPs to the farmers without any form of gradual "degressivity" or "capping"
gives the impression that EU aims to keep this form of income support schemes for ever, and
this is not going to be easily accepted by the other big trade partners. Then, the new reform is
referred only to the most important but limited number of product markets. This is going to
be also a challenge for the other parties during the negotiations. The Cairns group, for
instance, have pointed out that a number of products of their special interest, like sugar, rice,
                                                
20 Among other things, the effectiveness or not of the price cuts in eliminating EU export subsidies will depend
to a large extent on macroeconomic conditions such as the exchange rate of the euro against the US dollar. A
strong euro would decrease the world price for agricultural products in European terms and thus widen the gap
between EU prices and the world level, forcing the continued use of export subsidies.© EIPA
sheep meat, dried fodder, tobacco, olive oil, fruits & vegetables, have remained out of the
Agenda 2000 package and should be priority targets for further reform initiatives.
In this respect, the Commission has pointed that the EU will be going into the talks with an
“open” perspective. To a certain extent, this would mean that a further reform of CAP will
become inevitable before the expiration of Agenda 2000 perspective (2006), as a result not
only of meeting other internal needs of EU but mostly as a requirement to meet the new
world trade obligations.
As regards the liberalisation process, there is no doubt that agriculture will be again at the
centre of the round. But, this time, according to the EU’s approach at least, the food safety
issues (sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards), together with the state trading are likely to
have a larger importance than in UR. Even if such regulatory issues as the hormones in beef,
the GMOs, the labeling requirements, in connection with the BSE crisis, the use of antibiotics
in animal feed, etc are not entirely new, their importance seems to be now of high priority.
Once again, the three known protagonists in the agricultural negotiations (the EU, the US and
the Cairns group) have firmly deployed their strategy and their arguments. The scene,
therefore, is set for a heated and difficult round, which could struggle to meet the 3-year
deadline.© EIPA
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